​

Pure: https://research-portal.st-andrews.ac.uk/en/persons/joao-rafael-cunha/publications/

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2895-520X

ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joao_Rafael_Cunha

Google Scholar: https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=dMOZXhUAAAAJ&hl=en

​

​

Peer Reviewed Publications

 

(2021) Financial deregulation in the United States. In Y. Cassis & A. Drach (Eds.). Financial Deregulation: A Historical Perspective. Oxford University Press.

Working Paper Version: https://research-portal.st-andrews.ac.uk/en/publications/the-advent-of-a-new-banking-system-in-the-us-financial-deregulation

Book on the publisher's website: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/financial-deregulation-9780198856955

​

​

Working Papers

​

The Financial Regulatory Cycle

​

I present the idea of the financial regulatory cycle in the United States. I show that there have been three long cycles of financial regulation since the independence of the country in 1776. Moreover, there are also smaller cycles within these long regulatory cycles. Contingent capital may be a measure to curb the impact of the cycle. 

https://research-portal.st-andrews.ac.uk/en/publications/the-financial-regulatory-cycle

​

​

The Making of Financial Regulation - Voting on Financial Regulation in the U.S. Congress

​

This paper studies the voting patterns of member of Congress on financial regulation between 1991 and 2014. It uses the most comprehensive dataset assembled on campaign contributions from the financial sector and it is the first study taking a long-term perspective. This long-term approach allows me to address the problem of endogeneity in a new and more rigorous manner. It shows that campaign contributions are the strongest driver of congressional voting. This variable increases the likelihood of voting in favour of deregulatory bills.

 

​

Are Campaign Contributions a Lucrative Investment for Financial Companies? - Return on Investment of Campaign Contributions

 

​

This paper studies quantifiable returns of political involvement for U.S. financial companies. For this purpose, I construct a dataset with political and financial variables. This paper finds that the political engagement of financial companies is associated with lower probability, more risk-taking and a higher likelihood of being bailed-out.

 

 

Investors as Politicians - How Do Politicians with Investments in Financial Companies Behave as Financial Regulators?

 

This paper attempts to shed light into how the investment portfolio of legislators may in influence their voting. Particularly looking at investments in financial companies, I show that having investments in financial companies is an important factor in the voting behavior of congressmen. Being an investor in financial causes an increase of around 9 percent in the likelihood of voting for a smaller regulatory burden increases even when controlling for other incentives and political and ideological preferences. I report they are especially relevant when voting for bills proposing to tighten financial regulation.

​

​

Work in Progress

​

Credit Cycles, Financial Crises and Medium-Term Economic Growth (with S. Solomou)
 

Testing the Financial Regulatory Cycle

 

The Growth of UK Challenger Banks through Open Banking
 

Do Voters Affect Financial Regulation? - Evidence from the U.S. Congress

​